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Abstract 
 
The English National Health Service was established in 1948, and has therefore yielded some long 
time series data on health system performance. Waiting times for inpatient care have been a 
persistent cause of policy concern since the creation of the NHS. This paper develops a theoretical 
model of the dynamic interaction between key indicators of health system performance. It then 
investigates empirically the relationship between hospital activity, waiting times and population 
characteristics using aggregate time-series data for the NHS over the period 1952-2005. Structural 
Vector Auto-Regression suggests that in the long run: a) higher activity is associated with lower 
waiting times (elasticity = -0.9%); b) a higher proportion of old population is associated with higher 
waiting times (elasticity = 1.6%). In the short run, higher lagged waiting time leads to higher activity 
(elasticity = 0.2%). We also find that shocks in waiting times are countered by higher activity, so the 
effect is only temporary, while shocks in activity have a permanent effect. We conclude that policies to 
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Waiting times and waiting lists for health care have been a persistent phenomenon in the
UK National Health Service (NHS) since its inception in 1948. Waiting times have more
recently become a major health policy issue also in other OECD countries like Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and New
Zealand (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005). Average waiting times for common procedures, such
as hip and knee replacement, cataract surgery or varicose veins, vary from three to eight
months. However, it is only in the UK that waiting lists ￿gures have been recorded for
a period as long as ￿fty years. In this study we exploit for the ￿rst time these data in
order to analyse interactions between the average waiting times patients wait to receive
treatment, the volume of activity provided by hospitals, and population demographic
characteristics.
When it was created in 1948, the NHS e⁄ectively ￿ nationalized￿a previously some-
what anarchic network of hospitals and other providers that were owned and run by
local governments, charities and other not-for-pro￿t institutions. These hospitals were
placed under the management of local Hospital Management Committees answerable to
the national government. The new NHS sought to o⁄er comprehensive health care to all
citizens, free of charge. Most of the funding for the NHS came from national taxation,
and individual hospitals were funded through annual budgets from the regional o¢ ces
of the national ministry.
Primary care physicians (general practitioners) remained outside the salaried NHS,
and were instead o⁄ered a national contract to care for NHS patients. Almost all general
practitioners (GPs) accepted this contract, as the scope for private practice was now
limited. The NHS gave GPs an important ￿ gatekeeping￿role. Every citizen had to
register with a GP, and (except for emergency treatment) none could gain access to a
hospital specialist without a referral from his or her GP.
These arrangements gave rise to three potentially lengthy waits for the patient: the
time between the GP referral and the appointment with the specialist; the time waiting
for the results of any clinical tests and investigations requested by the specialist; and
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________the wait for receipt of inpatient treatment once a decision had been reached that such
treatment was required.
Although the NHS has been subject to many structural reforms since 1948, the
founding principles have remained in place largely unchanged in the ensuing sixty years.
The major change of note relevant to this paper was the split between local purchasers
and providers introduced in 1991. Geographically de￿ned local purchasers, in the form
of district health authorities, were given budgets to care for their populations. NHS
providers were split from these authorities and given separated boards of management.
They were then expected to compete for business from the health authorities in an
￿ internal market￿of hospital provision. Since 2000 the NHS provider market has been
gradually augmented to embrace a range of other not-for-pro￿t and for-pro￿t hospitals
(Rivett, 1998).
The NHS inherited a waiting list of over 400,000 patients waiting for hospital inpa-
tient treatment in 1948. This waiting list refers to the third of the patient waits described
above: the wait for hospital admission once the need for treatment had been agreed.
Ever since 1948, this waiting list - and the associated waiting times for treatment - have
been a stubborn feature of the NHS that has often become a focus of intense national
political debate and controversy. Furthermore, the NHS has collected annual data on
waiting lists in a broadly consistent format throughout its existence. It is therefore
possible to track the size of the waiting list over time.
On their own, waiting list data are not directly helpful in indicating the real concern
of patients: the length of time they have to wait for treatment. However, it is possible
to calculate a robust indicator of the expected wait for treatment by dividing the size of
the waiting list on an annual census date by the number of hospital admissions in the
year. This gives a measure of the ￿ time to clear the waiting list￿ . Whilst not the same
as the actual waiting time experienced by patients (this has not been collected over the
entire NHS lifetime), it is a good proxy that we use throughout this paper, e⁄ectively
adjusting the magnitude of the waiting list for current levels of supply.
A signal of the long-standing political concern with NHS waiting has been the large
number of initiatives launched by the government to reduce the waiting time for treat-
3
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especially long waits; a 1991 ￿ Patient￿ s Charter￿that guaranteed all patients treatment
within two years (soon reduced to 18 months); experiments with a range of patient choice
models, designed to encourage patients to seek out providers who o⁄er short waits; and
most recently a set of high-pro￿le hospital targets that have since 2001 brought down
the maximum waiting time to six months.
The political concern with waiting lists is matched by a concern with the levels of
expenditure of the NHS. The national government sets an annual budget for the NHS
in the light of national economic circumstances, pressure for public expenditure in other
public services, and demand pressures within the NHS. Waiting lists are an important
signal of those pressures, and are also politically important in themselves. A key role
of the government is therefore to balance the interests of taxpayers and patients, as
expressed in the budget it sets for the NHS.
The optimal balance between waiting and activity might be a⁄ected by numerous
uncertainties and shocks, such as changes in national income, demand side shocks and
changes in health care technologies and productivity. It is possible to propose a variety
of causal models of how activity and waiting times interact. For example, activity and
budget changes might be a⁄ected in the light of shocks to the waiting time. But equally,
the duration of the waiting time might in time be expected to respond to changes in
activity and budgets.
The long time series of data from the NHS o⁄ers a unique resource with which to
explore the long run dynamics of waiting times. This paper applies general time series
methods such as Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) to investigate the long-run
and short-run dynamics of NHS waiting times. More precisely, using aggregate time-
series data for the English NHS over the period 1952￿ 2005, we investigate the relationship
between activity, waiting times and the proportion of people aged 65 and over (a measure
of demographic pressures). The results suggest that in the long run: a) higher activity
is associated with lower waiting times (elasticity = -0.9%); b) a higher proportion of
the older population is associated with higher waiting times (elasticity = 1.6%). In the
short run, positive shocks in waiting times lead to higher activity (elasticity = 0.2%).
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have permanent e⁄ects.
We ￿rst give a brief review of the literature in section 2, and present a simple theoreti-
cal framework in section 3. The empirical methods (the structural vector auto-regression
approach) are then described in section 4. The scope of the data we can use are con-
strained by the need for availability over the entire time period. They are described in
section 5. The results are provided in section 6. Finally, we draw some conclusions on
the scienti￿c and policy implications of this study in section 7.
2 Literature review
Economists have traditionally viewed hospital waiting times as a non-monetary rationing
mechanism that reconciles limited supply with less limited demand for surgery (Lindsay
and Feigenbaum, 1984; Cullis, Jones and Propper, 2000). Over the past decade several
studies have sought to estimate models with waiting time a⁄ecting both the demand
for and supply of elective care. These studies normally use as a unit of observation
either a local geographical area (such as an electoral ward or district health authority)
or a health care provider (hospital). They are conducted either as static (one-period)
cross-sectional analyses or panel-data analyses (albeit using at most seven years of data).
The characteristics of these studies therefore contrast markedly with those of this paper,
where the analysis is undertaken at the national level with an annual time series of data
stretching back over 50 years to the formation of the NHS.
Previous theoretical studies of the relationship between waits and activity, model the
demand side on a utility maximising consumer who faces a choice between either delayed
access to treatment in the NHS free of charge, or immediate treatment at a ￿nancial cost
in the private sector. Supply side models are typically based on a utility maximising
hospital manager whose utility depends positively on the achievement of waiting time
performance (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin and Smith, 1999; Gravelle, Smith
and Xavier, 2003; Siciliani, 2006).
Depending on data availability, some supply models assume that queue length has
5
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supply (the number of inpatient admissions) (Martin and Smith, 1999; Siciliani, 2005).
In this equilibrium model, the theoretical impact of waiting time on supply is positive.
Other studies have access to both demand side data (additions to the waiting list)
and supply side data (hospital admission data), and so do not have to assume equilibrium
(Gravelle, Smith, and Xavier, 2003; Martin, Rice, Jacobs and Smith, 2003). It is then
possible to specify a model in which the hospital manager is concerned about waiting
time (or list) performance at the end of the current period. This can be forecasted as
a function of the waiting time at the beginning of the period, and additions to and
removals from the list in the current period. Increased activity improves the manager￿ s
end of period performance but induces greater demand in the following period, making it
more di¢ cult to hit future waiting times targets. The impact of waiting time on supply
is ambiguous, depending on how managers discount future utility.
Early evidence on NHS demand elasticities with respect to waiting time is provided
by Goddard and Tavakoli (1998) who estimate a demand function for NHS treatment
using panel data for 15 Scottish Health Board areas over 12 quarterly observations
(1990-92) for six specialties. They model the number of additions to the waiting list as
a function of the expected waiting time for NHS treatment. They ￿nd some dynamic
e⁄ects, necessitating the inclusion of a lagged explanatory waiting time variable, which
they suggest indicates the existence of a partial adjustment from one quarter to the
next. Elasticities exhibit the anticipated negative sign for all six specialties, ranging
from -0.017 for general surgery to -0.096 for orthopaedic surgery.
Martin and Smith (1999) estimate a similar demand model based on a more extensive
dataset. This empirical analysis is based on population data for all the routine surgical
specialties for 1991-92 and employes about 5,000 electoral wards as the unit of analysis.
The model assumes equilibrium in supply and demand and yields an elasticity of inpa-
tient demand with respect to the waiting time of about -0.21. In a subsequent study,
Martin and Smith (2003) apply the same model to a panel of seven years￿data. The
elasticity of demand with respect to the waiting time for all routine surgery is estimated
as -0.23 when the demand model is estimated in ￿rst di⁄erence form. Analogous models
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orthopaedics, and -0.17 for ophthalmology.
Studies by Gravelle, Dusheiko and Sutton (2002), Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003)
and Martin, Rice, Jacobs and Smith (2007) apply the same type of demand model to
panel data. They do not need to assume equilibrium between demand and supply, as
separate data on admissions from and additions to the list are available. Static and
dynamic models can therefore be estimated for a number of specialties, and using a
number of estimation methods. Demand elasticities with respect to waiting time are
broadly in line with previous studies, in the range -0.1 to -0.2.
On the supply side, there are fewer estimates of the responsiveness of inpatient supply
to waiting times. Using an equilibrium model, Martin and Smith (1999) report an
elasticity of supply with respect to waiting time for all routine surgical specialties of
2.93. A later dynamic speci￿cation yields an elasticity of 5.29 (Martin and Smith,
2003). These estimates are rather large and subsequent studies in which the assumption
of equilibrium is dropped, yield markedly lower elasticities, in the range 0.07 to 0.18
(Martin, Rice, Jacobs and Smith, 2007).
Where separate supply and demand data are available, Gravelle, Smith and Xavier
(2003) estimate an elasticity of supply of 0.083 with respect to mean waiting time, a
similar ￿gure to the one reported by Martin, Jacobs, Rice and Smith (2003). In a
study of a single hospital in Scotland over the period 1997-2001, Windmeijer, Gravelle
and Hoonhout (2005) report a slightly higher positive elasticity of overnight inpatient
admissions with respect to waiting times (0.40) and a more modest response for day
cases (with an elasticity of 0.13).
3 Theoretical framework
The dynamic behaviour of waiting times can be modelled in a variety of ways. In
this section we develop a very simple but quite general model to help motivate the
subsequent empirical work. De￿ne zt, wt and st respectively as activity, waiting time
7
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t denotes a shock on the demand. We assume that: a) demand is decreasing
in waiting time (Dw < 0): the higher the wait, the higher is the number of patients
who opt for the private sector or give up the treatment (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984;
Martin and Smith, 1999);1 b) demand is increasing in the proportion of older people
(Ds > 0): we use the proportion of older people s as a proxy for medical needs in the
population. Technological development is also likely to increase demand, but it is likely
to be captured by the same variable s as this is a trending variable.
Waiting times act as a non-monetary price which helps to bring the demand for and
the supply of heath care in equilibrium. We assume that the market for health care does
not clear instantaneously, so that an excess demand in one period increases waiting time
in the following period, while an excess supply reduces the waiting time. The speed of
adjustment of waiting times is denoted with ￿. Analytically,







We assume that the dynamics of the proportion of elderly people, our proxy of
medical needs in the population, is given by:




where cs is a positive constant and us
t is a shock.
Finally, we assume that activity evolves over time according to:
zt+1 = zt + c
z + ￿ (wt ￿ wt￿1) + u
z
t (3)
1We provide a reduced-form speci￿cation of the demand function. A more general speci￿cation
which models the choice of individual patients in terms of di⁄erent alternatives (public treatment,
private treatment and no treatment) is possible but would make the presentation more complex without
providing any additional insights.
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t is a supply shock and ￿ denotes the responsiveness
of activity to past variations in waiting times. This formulation implies that when
policy makers observe an increase in waiting time in one period, they are more willing
to fund increases in supply the subsequent period. Alternatively, providers might be
willing to work harder when waiting times increase either because of altruism or because
of ￿nancial or non-￿nancial incentives attached to waiting-time targets. Supply shocks
might be caused by changes in technology or e¢ ciency in organization, following reforms
in payment schemes for healthcare providers (for example a switch from ￿xed budgets
to activity-based funding).
In the long-run equilibrium, waiting times do not vary over time (dwt = dwt￿1 = 0)
so that demand for and supply of treatment have reached equilibrium (D(wt;st) = zt).
4 Methods
Our data naturally constitute a vector of time series, so we analyse them using the
popular Structural Vector Auto-Regression (S-VAR) approach (Hamilton, 1994). To
allow for the nonstationarity generated by potential unit roots, we distinguish between
long and short-term dynamics. For a generic vector of n variables yt = [y1t;y2t;:::;ynt]0,




￿jyt￿j + ut (4)
where ut is an independent, identically distributed sequence, with E (ut) = 0, E (utu0
t) =
￿ (full rank), for a ￿nite p (notice that ￿j is a matrix with dimension n ￿ p). This is a
generalisation to a vector of a standard AR(p) model, and it is known as VAR(p). We
assume that the elements of yt are subject to at most one unit root.2 The model in
(4) does not include any deterministic component, like an intercept or a time trend, for
example. As such, yt can be considered as a model for the deviations from a deterministic
term, usually a mean or a trend. If the data are not stationary, then the ￿j in (4)
implicitly di⁄erentiates the data, so the introduction of the constant in (4) generates a
2In this case, an initial condition like yt = 0 for all t ￿ 0 is also speci￿ed.
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levels yt.
The elements on the diagonals of ￿j describe the dependence of each variable on its
own past, while those o⁄the diagonal describe the interaction with the past of the other
variables. To disentangle and distinguish the di⁄erent contributions, the dynamics of
the VAR are expressed as a function of the original shocks ut. A stationary yt can be





Let ￿(kl)j be the element in the k-th row, l-th column of ￿j: a plot of ￿(kl)j against
the lags (j) is known as Impulse Response Function (IRF). The matrices ￿j describe
the e⁄ect of past shocks.3
Another useful tool is the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD), which
describes how much of the variation of each variable in yt is generated by shocks of any











If the multivariate process yt is stationary, the shocks have only temporary e⁄ects,
and the process reverts to zero (or, more in general, to the mean) over time. If yt is not
stationary, the shocks may have permanent e⁄ects as well. Even under nonstationarity,
however, there may nevertheless be some non-trivial vectors a of dimension n ￿ 1 such
that a0yt is stationary: in that case the deviations from the linear relation a0yt are only
3When ￿ is a diagonal matrix, ￿(kl)j is the e⁄ect of a shock to the lth variable on the kth variable
j periods ahead when the interactions embedded in the model are taken into account. However, when
￿ is not diagonal, shocks that a⁄ect ylt in￿ uence ykt as well, so a further hypothesis is necessary to
attribute the simultaneous movement to ult or ugt: this may be done by introducing the independent
vectors "t = ￿￿1=2ut, where ￿￿1=2 is the Choleski decomposition of ￿ = ￿1=2￿1=20, so that E ("t) = 0,
E ("t"0
t) = I (identity matrix). The elements of "t then identify shocks of each variable. Transforming
(5) as yt =
P1
j=0 ￿j"t￿j, where ￿j = ￿j￿1=2; a plot of the matrices ￿j against time gives the
Orthogonalised Impulse Response Function. Notice that, contrary to the matrices ￿j, the matrices ￿j
depend on the ordering of the elements of ut.
4As for the IRF, the decomposition is only in terms of ut, so the individual shocks may potentially
be correlated with each other: in order to attribute the shocks to one source only an identi￿cation
assumption is necessary.
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have non-zero coe¢ cient in a0yt are then co-integrated, and a is called a cointegrating
vector. For an n ￿ 1 vector yt, there may be h (such that h < n) non-trivial, linearly
independent vectors a: these may be indexed as a1;:::;ah, and may be stacked in a h￿n
cointegrating matrix A = [a1;:::;ah]. h is then the rank of A and it is also known as the
cointegrating rank.
Finding the h stable long-run relationships is of interest for their potential interpre-
tation in terms of economic theory. But there are also statistical reasons to motivate
the cointegration analysis: when yt is not stationary, the estimate of the VAR in (4),
of the IRF and the FEVD, are still consistent, but less e¢ cient, unless integration and
cointegration are properly taken into account.
Inference in a potentially cointegrated VAR is often done rewriting (4) as a Vector





￿j￿yt￿j + BAyt￿1 + ut (7)
for a n ￿ h matrix B. In this representation, long and short-run dynamics are modeled
separately, and the matrix B is the link between the two, because it expresses the e⁄ect
of a deviation from the long term equilibrium Ayt￿1 on the short term dynamics ￿yt.
The matrices ￿j then express the short-term interactions among the variables of interest.
When the cointegration rank h is known, simultaneous estimation of ￿j, B and A,
and inference in (7), can be obtained following Johansen (1991). When the cointegration
rank is not known, it must be estimated in advance: Johansen (1991) shows that it is
possible to test the null hypothesis that the cointegration rank is actually h against
the alternative that it is h + 1 (maximum eigenvalue test) or against the alternative
that it is n (trace test) (when h = n, the data are actually stationary). These tests
however require at least some preliminary knowledge of a potential h: when this is not
available, the tests are usually applied sequentially, starting from h = 0 and increasing
the cointegration rank that is being tested as long as the null hypothesis is rejected.
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All of the data employed have been extracted from the Compendium of Health Statistics
2005-06 published by the O¢ ce of Health Economics (Yuen, 2005). Unless otherwise
stated, the data cover the period 1952 to 2003 and relate to England and Wales.
Two indicators of the need for health care have been constructed: the all-age resident
population (which increases from 44 million in 1952 to 51.8 million in 2003) and the
percentage of the resident population aged 65 years and over (which rises from 11% in
1952 to 16% in 2003). Figure 1 also shows how the number of individuals aged 65 years
and over (measured in millions) rises from 5.8 millions in 1952 to 10.6 in 2003.
As a measure of NHS activity we employ the number of discharges and deaths (for
1952 to 1986) and then the number of ￿nished consultant episodes adjusted for multiple
episodes within a single spell of care (from 1987 to 2003) both divided by the all-age
resident population. This generates a measure of hospital activity per 1000 population
which varies between 74.4 discharges in 1952 and 261.1 discharges in 2003. Figure
1 shows how NHS activity (in 1￿ 000s) rises from 3,414 thousands in 1952 to 11,658
thousands in 2003.
Waiting time has been calculated as the number of patients on the waiting list
(overnight and day cases) as at the annual census date divided by either the num-
ber of discharges and deaths (1952 -1986) or the number of ￿nished consultant episodes
adjusted for multiple episodes within a single spell of care (from 1987 to 2003). This
provides an indicator of the "time to clear the waiting list", albeit only a proxy mea-
sure, as waiting list admissions comprise less than one half of all hospital admissions.
Although the waiting list has increased since 1952 ￿rising from just under 500,000 to a
peak of 1.25 million in 1997 ￿hospital capacity has increased at a faster rate so that the
time to clear the list (the list divided by annual activity) has declined from 1.7 months
12
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[Figure 1 here]
Three indicators of the volume of NHS inputs are also employed: ￿rst, the average
daily number of available NHS hospital beds across all specialties, which declines from
467,000 in 1951 to 198,000 in 2003; second, the number of medical doctors employed in
NHS hospitals, which increases from 13,639 in 1951 to 73,761 in 2003; and third, the
number of nursing and midwifery sta⁄, which rises from 162,000 in 1951 to over 416,000
in 2003. All three variables were standardised by the size of the resident population
so that in the analysis they track changes in physical inputs per 100,000 population.
Average inpatient length of stay in NHS hospitals across all specialties has declined
from 44 days in 1952 to 5 days in 2003.
Total NHS expenditure (available only at UK level) includes NHS charges paid by
patients for prescription medicines and dental charges, and has been adjusted to constant
(1949) prices using the GDP de￿ ator. National income is measured as GDP at constant
(1949) market prices.
6 Results
We have tried a number of speci￿cations which included NHS expenditure, sta⁄(doctors
and nurses), beds and GDP, but we found that these variables did not have a signi￿cant
role in explaining variations of waiting times over time. Also, they did not always lead to
stable models. We therefore excluded them from the ￿nal speci￿cation. A more detailed
discussion of the speci￿cation can be found at the end of this section.
In our preferred speci￿cation presented below, we analyse the dynamics and the
5Note that the use of day case surgery has become increasingly common for many procedures previ-
ously requiring inpatient treatment, and waits for day case treatment have been included in the NHS
waiting list data since 1987. We estimated the relatively small number of patients awaiting day case
treatment before 1987. This estimate was based on the number of day case admissions as a proportion
of ordinary (overnight) admissions. The estimated number of day case patients awaiting admission
was added to the o¢ cial ￿gure for inpatients awaiting overnight admission to derive a total awaiting
admission ￿gure (Martin, Jacobs, Rice and Smith, 2003).
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________interactions of waiting times w, hospital￿ s activity z (measured as discharges per capita)
and a demographic variable s (percentage of the population older than 65 years), over
the years between 1952 and 2003.
All the variables are in logarithms, in order to reduce the risk of heteroskedasticity.
Since our data are collected on a yearly basis, we have 51 observations for each time
series: with such a small sample, the reliability of the estimations and tests, that are
based on asymptotic theory, may sometimes be only approximative. We however feel
that this problem is mitigated by the fact that the data refer to a long period of over
￿fty years: since the system has evolved a lot over such a long span of time, it should
make it easier to detect the presence of long-term characteristics.
All tests assume a critical value of 5%. We consider a VAR augmented with a
constant: since we suspect that each element of yt = [st;zt;wt]
0 is subject to a unit root,
this corresponds to having a linear trend in the levels of the data.
We de￿ne the order of lags by estimating the VAR by OLS and then test if the last
lag is not signi￿cant with a likelihood ratio test: this procedure selects three lags (p = 3).
We also check that the residuals of the VAR(3) are not subject to heteroskedasticity and
do not exhibit structural instability in the equations.
We then test for cointegration. The test statistic and its limit distribution depend on
the nature of the deterministic component: given that the data exhibit a linear trend, we
assume a model with a deterministic trend. Since we have no preliminary information
on the potential number of cointegrating relations, we estimate the cointegration rank
iterating the cointegration test starting from h = 0: summary statistics for the maximum
eigenvalue and the trace tests are in Table 1; both tests indicate h = 1.
In this case, both A0 and B are 3 ￿ 1 vectors (recall that B expresses the e⁄ects of
deviations from the long-term equilibrium Ayt￿1). Notice that vector A (the weights
that characterize the long-term equilibrium) is only identi￿ed up to a scaling parameter,
because if A0yt is stationary, then for any non-trivial scalar k, kA0yt is also stationary.
Therefore, we normalise the estimated cointegrating relation for the waiting times. This
is also in accordance with the estimate of vector B, which describes how the cointe-
grating errors a⁄ect the short-run dynamics. In our case, deviations from the long-run
14
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________equilibrium do not seem to a⁄ect the short-run dynamics of the old populations and the
discharges: the coe¢ cients that correspond to the weights of the population and of the
discharge short-run dynamics, are jointly not signi￿cant (summary statistics of this test,
including the restricted estimate of vector B are in Table 2).
The estimated cointegrating equation is, under this assumption,





Standard errors are in parenthesis. In the long run, the waiting time w is lower when the
volume of discharges z is higher and is higher when the fraction of old population s is
higher. Since the model is in logarithms, the coe¢ cients in (8) can be interpreted as long-
run elasticity. Therefore, a 1% increase in activity is associated in the long term with
0.9% reduction in waiting times. Equation (8) also suggests that a 1% increase in the
older population is associated with 1.6% increase in waiting times: a larger proportion
of older people is likely to increase need and demand, driving up waiting times.
Our theoretical model in section 3 suggests that in the long-run equilibrium we have
wt+1 ￿wt = 0 so that D(wt;st) = zt. After di⁄erentiation we obtain @w = 1
Dw@z, which
combined with the second coe¢ cient in (8) provides Dw = 1
￿0:89 = ￿1:12. This suggests
a long-run demand elasticity of just above 1.1: an increase in waiting time of 1% implies
a reduction in demand of 1.1%.
Similarly, @w = Ds
￿Dw@s which implies that the elasticity of demand with respect to
the proportion of elderly people is Ds = 1:64￿1:12 = 1:83: an increase in the proportion
of older people of 1% implies an increase in demand of 1.8%.
Notice that although activity may respond to variations in waiting times in the short
run (see equation (3)), this is not the case in the long run. Since by assumption in the
long run wt+1 ￿ wt = 0, then the supply equation reduces to zt+1 = zt + cz + uz
t.
The short-term dynamics can be analysed through the orthogonalised Impulse Re-
sponse Function (IRF, see Figure 2) and the relative importance of the shocks in the
15
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[Figure 2 here]
In Figure 2, s, z and w refer respectively to the proportion of older people, discharges
and waiting times. Every diagram plots the response of each variable against itself and
the other two variables for a time lag that goes from 1 to 10 years.
Given that we have three variables, we need three restrictions to identify the orthog-
onalised IRF. We assume that the proportion of the elderly s is not a⁄ected by either
discharges z and waiting times w at least at the same time (￿rst and second restriction),
which is plausible: while we expect the proportion of older people to a⁄ect discharges
and waiting times, the proportion of older people should be exogenous. Graphically,
these identi￿cation restrictions are re￿ ected in the second and third ￿gure in the ￿rst
row of Figure 2 where the estimated coe¢ cient at t = 1 is equal to zero. We also as-
sume that discharges do not react to waiting times simultaneously but only with a lag
(third restriction, third ￿gure in the second row of Figure 2 at t = 1). This may seem
a more arbitrary restriction as we also may expect waiting times to a⁄ect discharges
simultaneously. However, if we impose the alternative restriction that discharges have
no simultaneous e⁄ects on waiting times, we still ￿nd that waiting time has no simul-
taneous e⁄ect on discharges. In contrast if we impose the restriction that waiting times
have no simultaneous e⁄ect on discharges, discharges have a negative simultaneous e⁄ect
on waiting times (see second ￿gure in third row of Figure 2 at t = 1). Therefore, our
chosen restriction appears empirically to be more appropriate.
The long-run relation of the cointegrating equation (8) can be observed by looking
at the three diagrams in the last row of Figure 2. Response of w to s: the waiting time
increases in the long run when the old population increases; and in Response of w to z:
the waiting time decreases in the long run, when the discharges increase.
Another relevant result is that a shock that increases the waiting time is countered in
the short term by an increase in activity (see Response of z to w), and that the waiting-
time shock is quickly absorbed (see Response of w to w), after which the increase of
16
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________discharges reverts to zero. At t = 2 the elasticity of discharges with respect to waiting
time is 0.2.6 Once a waiting-time shock occurs, the providers react by raising activity
to counter that shock so that the waiting time reverts to the mean within two or three
years. As soon as the waiting-time shock is reabsorbed, activity also goes back to the
original level.
While waiting-time shocks have only a temporary e⁄ect (see again Response of w to
w), the e⁄ect of changes of discharges is permanent, as suggested by the Response of z
to z: a shock on activity (for example due to a technological innovation or to a policy)
has a permanent e⁄ect on activity so that activity settles to the new level (changes in
policy that a⁄ect activity may indeed be permanent too).
Activity responds positively to the size of the older population in the long run,
as suggested by the Response of z to s. Finally, the proportion of elderly population
responds only to shocks of itself (which is consistent with our identi￿cation strategy)
and these shocks have a permanent e⁄ect: when the proportion of the elderly increases
it is unlikely to reduce afterwards.
All these results are also supported by the tests summarised in Table 3. The ￿rst
column suggests that the short-term dynamics of the elderly population does not depend
on activity and waiting time (test statistics are respectively 1.08 and 0.56 against a
critical value of 5.99). The second column suggests that the short-term dynamics of
activity does not depend on the dynamics of the elderly population but the positive
e⁄ect of waiting time is statistically signi￿cant (test statistics are respectively 1.90 and
8.11). The third column suggests that the short-term dynamics of waiting time does
not depend on the past short-term dynamics of the elderly population and activity
(test statistics are respectively 1.84 and 3.88). The reaction of waiting times to the
proportion of the elderly and activity is either instantaneous (as it is assumed for the
orthogonalisation of the IRF and the FEVD) or as a form of adjustment to the long-run
relationship.
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The relative importance of the shocks can be analysed through the orthogonalised
FEVD (see Figure 3). With the same identi￿cation of the IRF for the contemporaneous
shocks, more than 50% of the variation of waiting time can be attributed in the long
run to changes in the proportion of old population and to discharges (more than 20%
and of 30% respectively). The reverse e⁄ect, from waiting time to discharges, is rather
small.
The above analysis focuses on three variables only. This is mainly due to sample
size which obliges us to keep the number of variables limited. In order to consider al-
ternative speci￿cations we also estimated and simulated a variety of non-nested models.
Preliminary investigations in these models was based only on robust, possibly ine¢ cient
procedures. The most interesting result is that the e⁄ect of NHS expenditure on waiting
times seems at most weak, and that NHS expenditure does not seem to react to waiting
times. Indeed, funding constraints may have played a more important role in deter-
mining the amount of NHS expenditure, because NHS expenditure seems to be more
convincingly linked to variations in GDP. The numbers of doctors, nurses and beds have
no material e⁄ect on waiting times, nor do they react to it. The inclusion of length of
stay in the basic model suggests that lower length of stay decreases waiting times in the
long run (possibly due to the higher e¢ ciency of healthcare providers) and that in the
short run higher waiting times may reduce length of stay (providers work harder when
waiting times are higher). However, the inclusion of this variable comes at the cost of
inducing instability in the estimated model (in which case all the estimates would be
altogether inconsistent), so we excluded length of stay from our ￿nal speci￿cation.
7 Conclusions
This study has examined the short-run and long-run relationships between certain im-
portant policy variables within the UK health system over a ￿fty year period. The
relatively small number of observations means that we have had to be parsimonious in
18
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________the model speci￿cation. We found that the three most salient variables in modelling the
dynamics of the NHS were waiting times, hospital activity and the demographic pro￿le.
Other variables like total NHS expenditure, the supply of hospital beds and medical and
nursing sta⁄ did not seem to a⁄ect the dynamics of waiting times for treatment and
were therefore excluded from the ￿nal speci￿cation.
Our favoured model includes a clearly exogenous demographic variable (proportion
of elderly people) and the two endogenous variables, inpatient activity and waiting time.
The role of the demographic variable is straightforward: other things equal, it increases
waiting time in the long run (elasticity is 1.6%).
The most interesting policy ￿ndings relate to the interaction between activity and
waiting time. In the long run, higher activity is associated with lower waiting times
(elasticity is -0.9%), while in the short run, positive shocks in waiting times lead to
higher activity (elasticity is 0.2%). We also ￿nd that while shocks in waiting times are
likely to be temporary, shocks in activity are permanent. Furthermore, we ￿nd that
alternative speci￿cations of the model, in which NHS expenditure is substituted for
activity, do not exhibit such e⁄ects, suggesting that speci￿c initiatives to increase NHS
activity are likely to be more successful in reducing waiting times than general injections
of extra expenditure.
Compared to the existing literature, our implied demand elasticity (-1.12) is higher
in absolute values than suggested by existing cross-sectional or panel-data studies, which
￿nd an elasticity between -0.1 and -0.2. Therefore, a further policy conclusion is that
the reduction in waiting times arising from increases in supply may in the long run be
smaller than expected from previous studies. One possible explanation for this result is
that over time doctors might change their referral patterns. For example, when more
resources are made available to the NHS, doctors might relax the severity threshold for
referring patients for treatment, thereby muting the contribution of extra NHS resources
to reductions in waiting times.
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Table 1: summary statistics for the maximum eigenvalue and for the trace tests
Hypothesized h b ￿
P
b ! 5% c.v. b ! 5% c.v.
h = 0 0.419734 37.67 29.68 27.21 20.97
h = 1 0.140614 10.46 15.41 7.58 14.07
h = 2 0.056027 2.88 3.76 2.88 3.76
Note: b ￿, estimated eigenvalue; b !, Max-eigenvalue statistic; P
b !, Trace statistic; 5% c.v. = 5% critical value
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation.
Table 2: estimated restricted SVAR model
￿yt = b c +
2 X
j=1
b ￿j￿yt￿j + b B b Ayt￿1 + b ut, yt = [st;zt;wt]
0














Note: standard errors in parenthesis;
￿ indicates the restrictions imposed; # indicates the normalisation imposed.
LR test statistic: 3.93 (5% critical value, 5.99).
Table 3: tests on the short term dynamics (pairwise Granger Causality tests)
Test Statistic
Dependent variable




Note: 5% critical value, 5.99.
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Figure 1. Dynamics of elderly population (millions of individuals aged 65 or older),
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Response of X3 to X3
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations IRF, cointegration and restrictions imposed
Note: s = proportion of elderly people; z = activity; w = waiting time.
Response of s to s Response of s to z Response of s to w
Response of z to s Response of z to z Response of z to w
Response of w to s Response of w to z Response of w to w
23
Modelling the dynamics of a public health care system: evidence from time-series data







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent X3 variance due to X3
Variance Decomposition FEVD, cointegration and restrictions imposed
Percent s variance due to s Percent s variance due to z Percent s variance due to w
Percent z variance due to w
Percent w variance due to w
Percent z variance due to z Percent z variance due to s
Percent w variance due to z Percent w variance due to s
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